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Abstract 
 
This article explores the role of hostage (crisis) negotiation in the 21st century by reviewing literature 
on hostage negotiation historically, the dynamics of crisis situations typically encountered by hostage 
negotiators, the models existing to conceptualize crisis negotiation, and the strategies utilized by 
negotiators to successfully resolve crisis situations.  The article then suggests possible advancements or 
directions for further research within the field of hostage negotiation, with particular reference to the 
requirement for cross-cultural comparison of techniques and strategies utilized by negotiators 
internationally to provide a better understanding of the cultural uniqueness/understanding of crisis 
negotiators operating within different countries.  The article also suggests a shift in the focus of 
research looking at techniques and strategies which result in successful resolution of crisis situations 
onto the identification of negotiator characteristics and traits which govern effective negotiation and 
ability to cope with the pressures instilled by the role.   
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1.1 The Evolution of Modern Day Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation 
 
 The concept of hostage negotiation is shrouded in a wealth of misperception.  Hostage 
incidents are as old as recorded time and the evolution of hostage negotiation as both a criminal and 
socially acceptable act (e.g., in times of war) can be plotted throughout the ages.  The earliest 
recorded incidents can be traced back to biblical times in the book of Genesis 14: 12-16 with the 
abduction, and subsequent rescue, of Abraham’s nephew Lot by the armies of four kings.  Abraham’s 
use of 318 men to rescue his nephew is the first recorded account of the use of force to resolve a 
hostage incident (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986).  Similarly, there are multiple accounts of Israelites and 
their enemies taking each other captive as spoils of war, to deplete the resources of opposing enemies 
and to attempt to convert potential enemies to the cause (McMains & Mullins, 1996).  Helen of Troy’s 
abduction and the kidnapping of Julius Cesar for ransom in 51BC are also historically relevant events 
involving hostage scenarios.   
 
In post-biblical times, pirates of many nationalities have used hostages to obtain money or 
goods from third parties who valued the lives of those being held captive.  This form of hostage taking 
by pirates preceded the instrumental use of innocent captives by modern terrorists for social, political, 
or religious goals.  During the middle ages, hostages were taken by European nations to enforce the 
compliance of enemy nationals during the war.  This conceptualization of hostage taking links to the 
origin of the word “hostage” which is derived from the Latin hostis meaning “guest”.  This derivation 
demonstrates the highly frequent political and military use of hostages in the past, whereby political 
authorities or generals would legally agree to hand over one or usually several hostages in the custody 
of the other side, as guarantee of good faith in the observance of obligations.  In the early 20th 
century, hostage taking for this purpose continued, with hostages being taken by one nation to coerce 
another.  In 1942, for example, Germany took two million French hostages after the division of France 
in order to ensure compliance of the French people.  From this conceptualization of the hostage taking 
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incident, responses to such events have developed and evolved into what is now known as hostage or 
crisis negotiation.   
 
 The impetus for the development of modern hostage negotiation is debatable; however, one 
particular incident is cited by many law enforcement professionals as providing the driving force for 
the development of techniques to de-escalate crisis situations often involving hostages.  This incident 
is commonly referred to as the “Munich Massacre” that occurred at the 1972 Olympic Games.  During 
this incident, a group of Palestinian terrorists invaded an Olympic dormitory and seized 11 Israeli 
athletes as hostages.  The incident was dealt with via force; and once the terrorists political demands 
had been refused, the Munich police resorted to firepower, resulting in the death of 22 people: 1 
policeman, 10 terrorists and all 11 of the hostages.  This tragedy highlighted the distinct lack of 
protocol or procedure to deal with crisis situations in a controlled way and result in limited 
death/harm to hostages.  In the wake of this tragedy, international law enforcement agencies began 
to criticize the lack of effective crisis management techniques for hostage situations and began to 
explore new techniques which could be employed within such situations (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986).  
Since then, several models of negotiation have been developed for use in hostage situations, based 
primarily on problem-solving approaches to response, management, and resolution of these incidents 
(Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Lanceley, 1999; McMains & Mullins, 2001; Webster, 1998a).       
  
 In response to these tragic incidents, police agencies in the United States began implementing 
a "negotiate first" policy in dealing with both hostage taking situations and perpetrators barricaded 
without hostages (Boltz, 1979).  This policy led to the development of specialized hostage negotiation 
teams that include a designated negotiator, tactical assault team (TAC), command structure, and 
support personnel (Fuselier, 1981) with the primary aim of resolution and guiding principle being to 
minimise and eliminate the loss of life (McMains & Mullins, 2001).   
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1.2 Types of Hostage Situation 
  
 Hostage negotiation as an entity evolved from the tragic result of the Munich Massacre in 
1972 which has come to be known as an example of a 'traditional hostage-taking incident', however, 
research shows that hostage negotiation may be utilized within a variety of different scenarios and 
contexts.  Literature which has examined the type of scenario which involves the deployment of 
negotiators has identified that while every situation has unique aspects, there are some general types 
of hostage situation that police typically encounter (Boltz, Dudonis, & Schultz, 1996; McMains & 
Mullins, 1996; Rogan, 1997; Russell & Biegel, 1990).  These data have been used to create 
classification systems or typologies of crisis event situations.  Various authors have created different 
typologies or classification systems; an early system devised by Hassell (1975), for example, 
established that hostage takers fell into one of four basic categories including a) emotionally 
disturbed, b) criminal trapped in the commission of crime, c) prisoner in a revolt situation, and d) 
politically motivated; with the ratios of each subtype varying internationally in accordance with more 
common types of crime.  
 
More recently, Call (1996, 2003) has devised a more complex classification system based on 
hostage taker typology.  He states that there are six major types of hostage taker: the emotionally 
disturbed, political extremist, religious fanatics, criminals, prisoner inmates and a combination of two 
or more of the above.  Call goes further by identifying multiple subtypes under these typologies.  For 
example, under the emotionally disturbed category there are seven subtypes: brain damaged, 
elderly/senile, depressed, paranoid, schizophrenic, substance abuser and personal/family disputes 
(Fuselier, 1988; Gist & Perry, 1985; Kennedy & Dyer, 1992; Pearce, 1977; Strentz, 1986).  Similarly, the 
political extremist can be further sub-divided into subtypes.  Knutson (1980), for example, makes 
reference to the reluctant captor and the deliberate hostage taker and suggests the former to be 
dreamers and philosophers whose violent act was part of an attempt to right a wrong and who 
indicated that they were unwilling to kill their hostages, whereas the latter, on the other hand is 
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described as more instrumental in the act and is perfectly willing to kill his or her captives to obtain 
their perceived goal.  The religious fanatic can also be further subdivided, dependent on the particular 
cult/religion's internal mores and values (Cooper, 1981).  Further subcategories also exist amongst the 
criminal and prison inmate typologies, with Call (2003) making particular reference to the subtype of 
criminal psychopath. 
  
 In addition to the development of typologies, research has identified a variety of common 
characteristics exhibited within crisis/hostage situations within the United States.  This research has 
enabled a picture of the "common hostage situation" to be constructed, providing hostage negotiators 
with a model which conceptualizes the characteristics of the hostage situation, including details 
relating to the hostage taker's motivation, behavior, and the resolution of the incident.  Head (1990), 
for example, analyzed 3330 incidents of domestic hostage taking that occurred between 1973 and 
1982 and created a database entitled Hostage Event Analytic Database (HEAD).  Head identified ten 
common characteristics associated with domestic hostage taking which included: 
 
1. The majority of the perpetrators fit the criminal or prison inmate typology (52%). 
2. The second largest typology of perpetrators were the political extremist/religious fanatic 
(21%) followed by the emotionally disturbed (18%). 
3. The majority of perpetrators were young (25% below age 30), white (61%), male (80%) and 
acted alone. 
4. The usual number of victims captured was one (47%) or two (15%). 
5. The most common location for the crisis event was a form of transportation (35%) followed 
by a home (20%). 
6. The most common motivation for the perpetrator's actions was political/publicity (33%) 
followed by money (23%). 
7. The most common weapon used was a firearm (31%). 
8. The most common event duration was one day or less (53%). 
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9. The majority of incidents were non-lethal (87%).  However, hostages were more at risk for 
injury than the hostage taker. 
10. The majority of incidents were negotiated (64%). 
 
Similar research conducted at a later date by Feldman (2001) in Kentucky looked at 120 
hostage/barricade incidents, and identified seven characteristic factors: 
 
1. The majority of the perpetrators fit the personal/family dispute typology (31%). 
2. The second largest typology of perpetrators was criminal (26%) followed by the emotionally 
disturbed (19%). 
3. The majority of perpetrators were young (below age 30), male and acted alone. 
4. The most common motivation for the perpetrator's actions was an interpersonal dispute 
complicated by an underlying psychiatric disorder as well as alcohol or drug use. 
5. The most common weapon used was a firearm (75%). 
6. The majority of incidents ended in injury or death to either some of the hostages or to the 
perpetrator (88%). 
7. The majority of incidents were negotiated, but negotiations were successful in less than 40% 
of the time. 
 
 These findings illustrate the vast disparity in the characteristics of hostage/crisis incidents and 
suggest that although similarities exist, there is no one "typical hostage scenario".  This concept is also 
echoed within the literature focusing on classification systems and typologies of hostage situations, 
whereby systems and typologies are vast and disparate, with little convergence in terms of an 
established and agreed upon classification system.  It is clear that the classification system is 
dependent upon the type and source of data which are used to devise it, i.e. crisis situations will vary 
from state to state and country to country, so it is likely that situations will arise that cannot be neatly 
slotted in to one of the typologies.  The nature of "crisis" situations dictates that no two scenarios will 
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be exactly the same; therefore, the database of encountered crisis situations is ever expanding.  As 
such, typologies and classification systems should be interpreted with caution, and negotiators must 
be careful not to respond to the situation as a specific type of crisis incident, as opposed to a unique 
crisis scenario which may develop in any number of possible permutations.     
  
 Interestingly, despite the terminology used to describe the phenomenon, hostage negotiation 
does not always involve hostages.  While early research focused on what is referred to as the "first 
generation of negotiations" whereby negotiators were typically responding to terrorist hostage 
situations with political or religious motivations, the "second generation of negotiations", marked by 
the early 1980s demonstrated a clear shift in the types of incidents of greatest concern to the law 
enforcement agencies which involved emotionally disturbed individuals and trapped criminals.  Gist 
and Perry (1985), for example, found that the majority incidents which involved negotiators being 
called out were those including domestic, barricaded and suicidal incidents.  Research conducted by 
McMains (1988) reflected this shift by revealing that less than 18% of the incidents dealt with by 
negotiation over a five year period in 15 of the largest U.S. cities actually involved hostages.  In line 
with this, Hatcher, Mohandi, Turner, and Gelles (1998) noted a change in the type of typical scenario 
with negotiators working more with emotionally disturbed individuals, trapped criminals and domestic 
incidents and less with terrorists and prisoners.  Contrary to public misconception, negotiators are 
often being faced by people in the midst of an escalated personal crisis, as this quote from Noesner 
and Webster (1997, p.13) demonstrates: 
  
 "The majority of critical incidents to which law enforcement responds involve subjects who are 
motivated primarily by emotional needs...[and] these incidents may involve jilted lovers, 
disgruntled employees, or students, mood-disordered or  psychotic subjects, suicidal 
individuals, or individuals, who, for whatever reason, believe that they or their beliefs have 
been threatened or demeaned by society."  
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This demonstrates the varied and diverse nature of the role of the negotiator and provides an 
explanation for the change in terminology from "hostage negotiation" to "crisis negotiation" 
(McMains & Mullins, 1996) which is now commonly accepted amongst the negotiation literature.  
 
1.3 The Role of Mental Health in Crisis Situations 
  
 A key theme running throughout the literature highlights the increasingly common occurrence 
of crisis incidents involving individuals suffering from mental health problems.  Individuals with mental 
health problems are disproportionately represented within those identified as hostage takers.  For 
example, an early analysis of 245 hostage taking incidents reported to the FBI by US law enforcement 
agencies from 1976 to 1983 revealed that 145 of these incidents (59%) were attributed to individuals 
who were apparently suffering from a mental health disorder or who were experiencing emotional 
turmoil arising from personal problems or emotional disputes (Strentz, 1985).  Similarly, Miron and 
Goldstein (1979) found that the majority of people who take hostages suffer from some form of 
psychopathology, with hostage takers typically falling into four diagnostic categories: paranoid 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder (depressed type), antisocial personality and "inadequate personality" 
(Borum & Strentz, 1992).  The exact prevalence of mentally disturbed individuals committing hostage 
taking incidents still remains unclear with research reporting varied prevalence rates.  Research 
focusing specifically on the prevalence of emotionally disturbed individuals as perpetrators varies from 
52% (Fuselier, 1981; Strentz, 1987) to 88% (Butler, Leitenberg, & Fuselier, 1993) with variability 
perhaps attributable to the size of the agency and multiple definitions of "emotionally or mentally 
disturbed".  It should be noted, that this correlation between hostage taking incidents and the 
prevalence of mental health problems cannot be directly translated into a causal link.  Specifically, 
while a high proportion of those involved in hostage incidents may be more likely to suffer from 
mental health problems or emotional difficulties, this does not mean that a high proportion of those 
suffering from mental health problems are likely to take hostages.   
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 Historically, both psychologists and psychiatrists have been used to contribute to the 
development of negotiation techniques.  In the 1970s, Psychiatrist Mulder (1976) acted as a 
consultant to the Hague in the Netherlands and Scott (1976) adopted a similar role in the UK, advising 
Scotland Yard.  A number of psychologists also contributed to this field throughout the 70s and 80s 
(Bell et al., 1989; Miron & Goldstein, 1979; Stratton, 1978a).  The role of mental health professionals 
as advisors within crisis incidents is, therefore, not a new one.  However, the utilization of such mental 
health professionals has developed in line with the increasingly prevalent role of mental health within 
such incidents.  The existence of psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers within an advisory 
capacity is well established within hostage negotiation protocol in many parts of the United States. 
Researchers estimate that between 30% and 58% of agencies with a crisis/hostage negotiation team 
utilize a mental health consultant in some fashion and 88% of these tend to be psychologists as 
opposed to other mental health professionals (Butler, Leitenberg, & Fuselier, 1993; Delprinho & Bahn, 
1988; Fuselier, 1988).  Utilization of such advisors is also in existence within the UK, although on a 
much smaller scale.  This acceptance of the usefulness of psychological knowledge/input within 
hostage negotiation teams is a demonstration and public acknowledgement of the role of mental 
health within crisis situations.  Although the efficacy of mental health consultation within 
crisis/hostage situations has not been researched extensively, research conducted by Butler et al., 
(1993) found that the use of a mental health consultant to assess the perpetrator resulted in fewer 
hostage incidents leading to the serious injury or death of a hostage, more negotiated surrenders, and 
fewer incidents in which the SWAT team had to enter to arrest the suspect.  Similar support for the 
use of mental health professionals is also exhibited anecdotally by many of the major city police 
departments in the United States, including the Los Angeles, New York City, San Antonio, San 
Francisco, and Houston Police Departments, who report highly effective outcomes from their 
crisis/hostage negotiation teams with deaths to hostages and hostage takers extremely rare 
(McMains, 1993).     
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 The role of mental health within crisis situations is echoed by the terminology of "crisis" itself.  
And research indicates that mental health is likely to play a role in at least a proportion of the hostage 
or crisis incidents that negotiators are involved with for some time to come.  This concept is resonated 
in line with the rising prevalence of mental health problems within society today, with recent research 
demonstrating a 46.6% lifetime prevalence rate of DSM-IV classified disorders - a figure which is 
higher than in previous cohorts (Kessler et al., 2005).  These findings implicate and highlight the need 
for continued involvement of mental health professionals as advisors within the negotiation arena for 
the foreseeable future. 
  
1.4 Negotiation Strategy 
 
 Crisis negotiation has come to be known as "one of law enforcement's most effective tools" 
and this statement is consistently supported by the successful resolution of tens of thousands of 
hostage, barricade, attempted suicide, and kidnapping cases throughout the world (Regini, 2002, p.1).  
Such a contention is also supported by data from the Hostage Barricade database System (HOBAS) 
established by the Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU) of the FBI.  HOBAS serves as a database on 
hostage/crisis incidents through the systematic collection of cases (post incident) from law 
enforcement agencies across the United States.  An analysis of HOBAS data from 2002-2003 indicated 
that approximately 82% of reported incidents were resolved without death or injury to the subject or 
the victim (Flood, 2003).  Similarly, a considerable number of case studies and anecdotal reports 
further attest to the efficacy of crisis negotiation (see McMains & Mullins, 2001; Rogan, Hammer, & 
Van Zandt, 1997).  However, despite this excellent success rate, the rapidly increasing phenomenon of 
hostage taking continues to challenge law enforcement professionals worldwide (Call, 1996; McMains 
& Mullins, 2001; Romano, 1998).  For this reason, it is essential to establish what makes a negotiator 
effective, and what strategies are effective within such situations, so as to improve the success rate of 
negotiations and minimize the loss of life for both hostages and hostage takers.    
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The art of crisis negotiation has been described by some as a “complex verbal dance between 
the negotiator and the subject” (Kellin & McMurty, 2007, p.30).  Crisis negotiation exists on a 
spectrum of infinite situational variables, with scenarios and ‘key players’ shifting over time with each 
contextual change.  Some situations involve hostages, while others do not.  Some subjects are suicidal, 
some are homicidal, and in some cases the subject may display both types of behavior.  Some 
incidents involve weapons or explosives, whereas other are deemed unmanageable by the barricade 
location or pragmatic logistics associated with the scenario.  Given the infinite range of possible 
situations that may be encountered by hostage (crisis) negotiators internationally, it is unrealistic to 
think that specific strategies for each situation can be learned by the negotiator.  Instead, what is 
required is a flexible working model of negotiation that can be adapted to each individual scenario, 
providing the best possible outcome for the crisis situation.  In essence, a good working model of crisis 
negotiation must be flexible enough that it applies to virtually any situation regardless of the context, 
subject state-of-mind, or other constraints (Kellin & McMurty, 2007).    
 
 Although every hostage/crisis incident is different, and involves an infinite number of 
variables, research conducted by a number of researchers has managed to establish a basic 
consensual protocol for handling hostage crises at a macro level, as a result of training and experience 
(Call, 2003; Greenstone, 1995, 2005; Lanceley, 1999; McMains, 2002, 2003; McMains & Mullins, 1996, 
2002; Miller, 2005, 2006; Noesner, 1999; Noesner & Dolan, 1992; Noesner & Webster, 1997; Slatkin, 
1996, 2005; Wind, 1995).  The basic elements of this protocol include: 
 
• Isolate and contain the hostage taker and secure the perimeter to keep the hostage taker in 
and unauthorized persons out. 
• Provide for scene control.  This may involve mobilizing medical service, controlling the local 
traffic, dealing with the media, and keeping the surrounding community sufficiently informed 
to protect their safety. 
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• Establish some form of communication with the hostage taker, such as line phone, cell 
phone, bullhorn - even digital pager or email - as soon as possible. 
• Employ socialized communication strategies, such as rapport building and active listening. 
• Respond appropriately to demands and deadlines, with the overriding goal being the safety 
of the hostages. 
• Structure the surrender ritual and resolution of the crisis carefully and known when to 
employ a tactical response, if absolutely necessary. 
• Utilize operational and stress debriefing techniques on hostages, hostage takers, and crisis 
team members as appropriate. 
 
This protocol provides an overall blueprint for managing the situation from both a tactical and 
negotiator perspective.  Similarly, research has addressed the negotiation procedure on a more micro 
level by exploring the strategies that have been used and have been found to be successful within the 
negotiation procedure.  As a result of this, these strategies have been adopted by law enforcement 
professionals within their roles as negotiators with the aim of reducing/minimising the loss of life 
during such crisis situations.  Many of these strategies have been born out of models of crisis 
negotiation.  Some of the key models of negotiation are outlined below.   
  
1.5 Models of Negotiation 
 
1.5.1 Principled Negotiation 
 
 One of the earliest models of negotiation was proposed by Fisher and Ury (1981) and 
expanded upon by Fisher, Ury, and Patton in 1991.  Principled negotiation focuses on what is referred 
to as an "interest-based" approach to conflict resolution.  The model advocates four fundamental 
principles of negotiation: 1) separate the person from the problem, 2) focus on mutual interests 
instead of individual positions, 3) generate options for mutual gain, and 4) insist on using objective 
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criteria to judge the effectiveness of the agreement.  The initial principle works on the basis that 
people tend to become personally involved with the problem and therefore will often interpret 
outsiders responses as personal attacks.  The second principle works on the basis that good 
agreements focus on the parties' interests, rather than their positions.  When individuals are focused 
on defining a problem in terms of positions, there will inevitably be one party who will "lose" the 
dispute.  In contrast to this, when a problem is defined in terms of the parties' individual underlying 
interests it is often possible to find a solution which satisfies both parties' interests.  The third principle 
focuses on the generation of options and is based on the concept that generation of options that will 
mutually benefit both parties will result in eventual successful resolution of the conflict.   
 
The final principle relates to the importance of using objective criteria to judge the 
effectiveness of the agreement.  This principle is particularly salient when parties' interests are directly 
opposed.  In such situations, Fisher and Ury's (1981) model proposes that individuals should develop 
objective criteria which is appropriate for the situation and should use this criteria to govern 
agreements and resolution of the conflict.  Examples of such criteria include scientific findings, 
professional standards, or legal precedent and adherence to such criteria helps to preserve the 
relationship between the parties, an aspect which is vital when negotiating crisis situations.  This early 
model of negotiation was seen to be influential and provided negotiators with a framework for the 
utilization of problem-solving techniques to respond to, manage and resolve crisis incidents.  Although 
this model provided a useful tool for early negotiators, it has been critiqued for its lack of applicability 
to many crisis situations due to the prerequisite for both parties involved to be functioning in a 
rational cognitive state.  Many of the principles outlined by Fisher and Ury (1981) simply could not be 
implemented with an individual who was suffering from a severe mental illness or emotional conflict, 
as they would be unable to go through the processes outlined in a rational manner.   
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1.5.2 The "Getting Past No" Model of Negotiation 
 
 Ury (1991) built upon previous work within the conflict resolution arena by developing a five-
step model for people engaged in difficult negotiations and applied this to a variety of settings, 
including that of hostage negotiation.  The first step is entitled "Don't React - Go to the Balcony" and 
Ury describes this stage as a shift from the negotiator as a participant in the process to an observer in 
the negotiation process.  Ury utilizes the analogy of the negotiator acting as a third party standing on a 
balcony watching actors perform a play on a stage, rather than being part of the play themselves.  The 
negotiator needs to avoid any form of anger, confrontation and emotion, and this can be achieved by 
shifting the dynamics of the negotiator from participant to observer.  The second step is entitled 
"Stepping to Their Side" and refers to the requirement for the negotiator to paint the hostage taker in 
the light of an ally rather than an opponent.  By making the subject a partner in the process and 
making them perceive that they are working together to form a resolution, this is more likely to result 
in successful peaceful resolution of the crisis situation.  Echoing the recurring theme running 
throughout many of the crisis negotiation models, this step can be achieved by utilizing active listening 
skills, such as mirroring, paraphrasing, emotional labelling and summarising.   
 
The third step is entitled "Change the Game" and refers to the concept of reframing subject 
demands so as to avoid rejecting the hostage takers demands which is likely to result in resistance.  
This step can be achieved by utilizing open-ended questions which force the subject to think about 
possible solutions and alternatives, deflecting attacks from the subject and reframing problems to 
reveal future solutions.  The fourth stage of Ury's model is entitled "Build a Golden Bridge" and this 
essentially relates to the negotiator's attempt to make it easy for the subject to say "yes" instead of 
"no".  The negotiator has to make the hostage taker a willing partner in the negotiating process by 
involving them in the decision-making process.  If the negotiator attempts to force compliance, this is 
likely to result in resistance and continuation of unrealistic demands.  Consequently, the aim is for the 
negotiator to help generate ideas from the subject to help them feel part of the process and 
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encourage collaboration.  It has also been suggested that in getting the hostage taker to say yes, this 
has a mutually beneficial effect, as it benefits the negotiation process by encouraging successful 
resolution, but it also helps the subject to save face - an element which plays a role in the successful 
resolution of crisis incidents (Mullins, 2002).   
 
The final stage in the model is entitled "Make it Hard to Say No" which expands upon the 
fourth stage by not only increasing the subject's desire to say "yes", but also making it harder for the 
subject to say "no", thereby increasing the chances of successful resolution of the incident.  This 
model provides a toolbox of techniques to utilize within crisis situations, but again, relies on some 
element of cognitive rational processing on behalf of both parties, an aspect which is often lacking 
within the hostage taker mentality.  In line with the recurring theme of emotionally disturbed or 
mentally disordered individuals involved in crisis incidents, it is likely that these individuals will require 
a different negotiation approach, which is less systematic or hierarchical and more crisis-intervention 
based.  Once cognitions and rationalization have been restored somewhat, more cognitively based 
problem solving techniques, such as those discussed above can be employed.     
  
1.5.3 The Crisis Bargaining Model 
 
 Donohue, Kaufmann, Smith and Ramesh (1991) utilize a different model to describe strategies 
used by hostage negotiators.  Their model focuses on the type of bargaining that parties involved in 
the negotiation utilize and identifies and distinguishes between crisis (distributive) and normative 
(integrative) bargaining.  The model incorporates the notion of both relationship (expressive) and 
substantive (material) issues being addressed with differing levels of preference at different stages 
throughout the negotiation process.  The model works on the basis that the initial stages of 
negotiation tend to focus on relational issues, such as power, role, trust and status between police 
and hostage takers.  Once these issues become resolved, more attention or weight gets placed on 
substantive issues to resolve the problem.  In essence, crisis bargaining is about relationships and 
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normative bargaining is more focused on resolving material issues.  Donohue et al. (1991) apply this 
model to hostage negotiation strategies by trying to move hostage takers away from crisis bargaining 
and towards normative bargaining in order to resolve the crisis situation.  Ideally, negotiation should 
progress in a step-wise manner from crisis to normative bargaining; however, Donohue and Roberto 
(1996) note that this is not always the case.  Hammer and Rogan (1997) make a similar distinction in 
their communication-based negotiation model whereby they identify instrumental, relational, and 
identity issues within a negotiation, and specify the need for negotiators to steer hostage takers away 
from crisis (i.e., relational and identity) bargaining modes (where relational and identity issues are 
prevalent) to normative bargaining modes (where instrumental needs are paramount), which is more 
likely to result in successful resolution of the crisis situation.  Donohue et al.'s (1991) model focuses 
less on specific techniques and more on adapting the style of negotiation to the appropriate needs of 
the perpetrator (i.e., by focusing on crisis or normative bargaining, respectively).  
 
1.5.4 The S.A.F.E. model of crisis negotiation 
 
 The S.A.F.E. model was developed by Hammer and Rogan (1997) and forms a key part of many 
negotiator toolboxes today.  The model was devised on the basis of a combination of behavioral 
science research and insights of numerous operationally active crisis negotiators.  The model creates a 
specific framework for de-escalating and resolving  crisis situations by incorporating a variety of 
effective strategies within a communication plan to influence the behavior of the subject (e.g., 
hostage taker, suicidal individual) in a positive manner.  The S.A.F.E. framework assesses and tracks 
what the authors refer to as four key "triggers" for de-escalating crisis situations.  The authors propose 
that by assessing and monitoring these triggers, negotiators can adopt the appropriate strategy to 
respond to the situation which is more likely to result in a positive resolution.  The four triggers are 
described as: "Substantive Demands", "Attunement", "Face" & "Emotion" with each functioning as a 
predominant 'frame' within which the subject and negotiator communicatively interact as a crisis 
incident unfolds.   
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The initial frame makes reference to Substantive Demands whereby the instrumental interests 
and needs expressed by the parties are identified.  The S.A.F.E. model indicates that when the subject 
is in a substantive demands frame, the negotiators goal is to bargain or problem-solve with the subject 
to achieve a peaceful surrender.  The second frame - Attunement, refers to the relational trust which 
has been established between the subject and the negotiator.  The S.A.F.E. model states that the 
negotiators goal in this frame is to engage in cooperative behavior to build trust and liking (without 
compromising safety or security concerns).  This frame is akin to rapport building within the 
therapeutic relationship.  The third frame - Face, refers to the projected self-image of the subject and 
the model proposes that the negotiator’s goal in this frame is to validate the face needs of the subject 
in order to promote face honouring and de-escalation of the situation.  The final frame - Emotional 
Distress refers to intense, negative emotions that compromise an individual's ability to cope with the 
stress of a crisis situation.  The goal of the negotiator in this frame is to help subjects cope with their 
emotional distress in a way that permits them to re-assess the situation and then influence the subject 
towards a cooperative resolution. 
 
 The focus of the S.A.F.E. model refers to appropriate identification of the subject's current 
dominant S.A.F.E. frame, appropriate matching of communication style to the S.A.F.E. frame of the 
subject, and then utilization of strategies in order to effectively facilitate resolution of the needs 
expressed by each frame or shift to another S.A.F.E. frame in order to de-escalate the situation.  Rogan 
and Hammer (1997) propose that the S.A.F.E. model offers a comprehensive approach for assessing, 
evaluating and developing effective response strategies to subject's behavior in crisis incidents.  They 
propose that the model should be incorporated into the toolbox utilized by crisis negotiation teams 
(Hammer, 1997). 
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1.5.5 The Behavioral Influence Stairway Model 
  
One of the most recent models of crisis negotiation is that of the Behavioral Influence 
Stairway Model (BISM) developed by Vecchi (2007a).  The BISM is a model of behavior change 
grounded in the principles of active listening that was adapted from a model developed by the 
FBI/CNU (Vecchi, Van Hasselt, & Romano, 2005).  The BISM highlights the importance of the 
relationship –building process involving the negotiator and the subject in order to achieve a peaceful 
resolution to the crisis situation (Noesner & Wesbter, 1997).  This relationship has been found to be a 
key element for the successful resolution of both barricaded and crisis situations (Vecchi, et al., 2005).  
The BISM shares parallel concepts with models of Motivational Interviewing, with emphasis being 
placed on the utilization of skills such as empathy, rapport and active listening in order to facilitate 
behavior change.  In line with this, the BISM consists of four elements: 1) active listening skills, 2) 
empathy, 3) rapport, and 4) behavioral influence.  Progression from stage 1 to stage 4 occurs by 
utilizing these skills (underpinned by active listening throughout) with the aim of building a 
relationship with the subject in order to facilitate behavior change.  The key element of active listening 
has been shown to facilitate behavior change and crisis resolution (Lanceley, 1999; Noesner & 
Webster, 1997) and hence justifies this underpinning.  Research indicates that as this process is 
utilized effectively, the probability of positive behavior change increases, thus becoming a building 
block towards the successful resolution of the crisis situation (Vecchi, et al., 2005).   This statement is 
supported via anecdotal evidence whereby the heuristic value of the BISM has been documented in 
the resolution of a wide range of highly volatile crisis situations (Flood, 2003); as such it demonstrates 
the applicability and efficacy of the BISM within the negotiation arena. 
 
1.5.6 The Cylindrical Model of Crisis Communications 
 
 The Cylindrical Model of Crisis Negotiation was devised by Taylor (2002a), who highlighted the 
complex nature of negotiation focusing on levels of interaction, motivational emphases, and behavior 
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intensity within negotiations.  The model was compiled by utilizing qualitative data from nine resolved 
cases of hostage negotiation with results of analysis via nonmetric multidimensional scaling solution 
revealing clear empirical support for the cylindrical nature of communication behavior (Taylor, 2002).  
The model proposes there to be three general levels of interaction behavior during negotiations 
ranging from avoidance, to distributive, to integrative, a concept which is analogous to the crisis vs. 
normative bargaining conceptualization proposed by Donohue, Kaufman, Smith, and Ramesh (1991) 
and Donohue and Roberto (1993).  Taylor's model proposes that negotiators aim to move subjects 
through these levels progressively in order to move subjects away from non-active participation 
(avoidant) interaction through to a degree of cooperation which may be based on self-interest 
(distributive) through to eventual normative and cooperative communication (integrative) that will 
result in reconciliation of the parties' respective divergent interests.  Second, the model proposes the 
existence of three different motivational emphases within negotiation behavior, and classifies these as 
Instrumental, Relational, and Identity themes.  The first theme refers to behavior which is linked to the 
subject's instrumental needs which can be described as tangible commodities or wants.  The second 
theme refers to behavior which is linked to the relationship or affiliation between the negotiator and 
the subject; and the third theme refers to the negotiating parties' concern for self-preservation or 
"face" (Goffman, 1967).  
 
Finally, the model proposes the existence of a third variable within negotiations, which Taylor 
refers to the intensity of negotiation behavior.  This concept relates to the degree to which intense 
behaviors are utilized within negotiations, with research indicating that a speaker's attitude towards a 
concept deviates more from neutrality with more frequent use of obscure metaphors, profanity, and 
dramatic changes in intonation (Bowers, 1963; Donohue, 1981; Lewicki, Saunders & Minton, 1999).   
Similar research has shown that the use of such intense behaviors has a detrimental effect on 
negotiation, increasing the tendency for conflict and for negotiation break-down (Lewicki, Saunders, & 
Minton, 1999).  The strength of Taylor's model lies in its conceptualization of negotiation behavior as 
inter-related communication components, rather than discrete, mutually exclusive categories.  As 
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such, the cylindrical model avoids the criticism of early, static style-based frameworks for negotiation 
as it enables both researchers and negotiators to consider the changing pattern of communication 
behavior across the whole negotiation process (Taylor, 2002).  Taylor's model provides a detailed 
micro-level analysis of crisis behavior and provides a detailed and unique insight into the multi-
dimensional existence of negotiation behavior.      
 
1.5.7 Structured Tactical Engagement Process (STEPS) Model  
 
 Kellin and McMurty (2007) have recently devised the Structured Tactical Engagement Process 
model.  The model provides a framework for both understanding and influencing a barricaded 
subject's behavior in order to reach a peaceful resolution by utilizing principles from the 
Transtheoretical Stages of Change Model (Prochaska & DiClemente, 1986).  Kellin  & McMurty propose 
that in line with any form of behavior, a crisis situation has to go through four stages in order to reach 
successful resolution.  The stages consist of Precontemplation (Step 0), Contemplation (Step 1), 
Preparation (Step 2) and Action (Step 3), with the final stage resulting in behavioral change that results 
in successful and peaceful resolution.  The authors propose that a variety of skills/techniques can be 
utilized in order to help guide subjects through these four stages.  The initial stage of any negotiation 
is characterized by the Precontemplation stage, whereby the subject is unwilling to acknowledge that 
the situation or their behavior needs to change.  The subject tends to be uncooperative and unrealistic 
at this point in the negotiation and it is the role of the negotiator to steer the subject away from this 
stage and into a Contemplative stage whereby they can begin to contemplate a change in behavior or 
situation.   
 
Research has implicated the role of rapport in facilitating behavior change (Miller & Rollnick, 
2002) and application of this finding to the negotiation procedure indicates the benefit of the 
formation of a connection between the subject and the negotiator.  As this connection grows, the 
individual is less likely to be defensive and more open to suggestion (Kellin & McMurty, 2007) and 
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behavior change becomes more likely.  Once rapport has been established and the subject has moved 
from Step 0 to Step 1, the subject is likely to be realizing that their behavior and the current situation 
needs to change, but they are not quite sure how to go about implementing this.  It is, therefore, the 
negotiators job at this stage to gently affirm the need for a peaceful resolution while increasing the 
subject's confidence to move into Step 2.  Once the subject is committed to working with the 
negotiator and his/her confidence has increased, the subject moves to the penultimate phase of Step 
2 - Preparation.  At step 2, the subject has identified that there is a problem and that their behavior 
needs to change, and they are beginning to consider and possibly commit to a resolution. During Step 
2, the negotiator's role becomes more proactive and directive with the key role being problem-solving 
in order to develop an appropriate exit strategy.  The negotiator must then try to maintain a degree of 
motivation and confidence in the subject in order for them to progress to the final Step - Action.  
During the final stage, the subject should be carrying out the agreed-upon plan for peaceful resolution 
of the situation.  It is vital that the negotiator remains supportive and directive throughout the final 
step, until resolution has been achieved.   
 
 The STEPS model incorporates many of the concepts of the transtheoretical model of change 
(Prochaska & DiClemente, 1986) and motivational interviewing in order to facilitate and encourage 
behavior change in an individual.  There are parallels between the use of such techniques in 
counseling, whereby active listening skills will be utilized in order to establish rapport and positive 
therapeutic relationships with clients (Evans, Hearn, Uhlemann, & Ivey, 1989; Hersen & Van Hasselt, 
1998) which, in turn, increases the likelihood of behavior change. 
  
1.6 Conclusion & Future Directions 
 
 It is clear from the variety of models which have been devised to account for effective 
negotiation strategies that there is no singular theoretical blueprint which can be adhered to in order 
to achieve successful resolution of crisis situations.  This toolbox or library of negotiation strategies 
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and techniques has been built up via a combination of operationally successful negotiations and 
academic research and provide a set of resources which negotiators can refer to and adopt within 
their roles.  It seems prudent to suggest that a combination of strategies or techniques may be useful 
depending on the circumstances of the crisis situation.   
 
 It is also important to note that the models discussed above relate specifically to the 
culture/society in which they were devised and as such may not be directly applicable cross-culturally.  
The majority of the research on crisis negotiation has been conducted in the United States and has 
particular relevance to countries which adhere to the right to bear arms.  As a result, research within 
cultures and countries which do not bear arms may reveal interesting comparisons in terms of 
strategies and techniques which tend to be effective.  Of particular interest is police hostage 
negotiation in the UK, an aspect which has not been investigated to date.  An analysis of hostage 
negotiation within the UK would enable a model of negotiation to be devised providing a forum for 
cross-cultural comparison with US-based models of crisis negotiation. 
 
 Finally, analysis of the literature focusing on crisis negotiation has identified a common theme 
linked to effectiveness/success of negotiations.  This theme has tended to focus on the techniques and 
strategies employed by the negotiators during the crisis.  An aspect which has not been explored in 
such detail is that of the characteristics, traits and skills which may enhance a negotiators ability to 
perform effectively within their role.  In line with this, it is proposed that certain fixed and malleable 
traits, such as personality, coping style, decision-making style, emotion regulation and emotional 
intelligence, may play a role in the ability of individuals to successfully perform and cope with their 
role.  Future research in this direction would have implications for both the selection and training of 
operationally active negotiators and may yield a tool to help select appropriate individuals for the role, 
identify specific training needs, and enhance operational skills in order to increase the successful 
resolution of hostage (crisis) incidents internationally.  
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